


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


24 October 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 October 1962

### DAILY BRIEF

USSR: Moscow's initial reaction to President Kennedy's speech is cautiously contrived to make no commitment to specific Soviet countermeasures without giving any appearance of acquiescing to the measures announced by the President.

The USSR has taken several routine steps to underscore its full military preparedness to meet any eventualities. The commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, Marshal Grechko, ordered Pact representatives in Moscow to increase the military readiness of member nations. Defense Minister Malinovsky reported to the Soviet Government on measures to raise the "battle readiness" of Soviet armed forces. Moscow announced that all military leaves have been canceled and that release from active duty for members of the strategic rocket forces, antiaircraft defense forces, and the submarine fleet had been postponed until further notice.

The Soviet statement of 23 October, warning that the US is "recklessly playing with fire," appears to be primarily aimed at placing the US on the defensive and generating world-wide opposition to US policy in the Cuban crisis. The statement evaded the central question of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba and reaffirmed Moscow's 11 September contention that military equipment being sent to Cuba is

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"designed exclusively for defensive purposes." It sought to play down the USSR's role in the crisis by portraying the issue as one between Cuba and the US.

Although the statement denounced the US quarantine measures and denied Washington's right to inspect foreign vessels on the open seas, it avoided any hints of Soviet reaction. The statement also implied that the USSR will seek to circumvent the US demand for prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons by contending that all weapons in Cuba are defensive and owned by Cuba.

As in the 11 September statement, Moscow again attempted to justify its military presence in Cuba by pointing to the deployment of US forces and armaments throughout the world and to US rejection of Soviet proposals for withdrawal of all foreign forces from alien territories.

\*Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have issued formal statements closely paralleling the Soviet government statement and expressing their "full support" for the Soviet stand. Similar statements can be expected from the other satellite regimes.

The European satellites have begun an extensive propaganda attack on the President's speech with the heaviest comment thus far coming from East Germany.

Communist China has joined the rest of the bloc in condemning the US blockade as a serious menace to peace in the Caribbean area. Peiping's commentary has thus far contained no threat of a Chinese counter-action.

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DAILY BRIEF

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

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**COMMUNIST CHINA-INDIA BORDER AREA**



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Sino-Indian Border: Bitter clashes are reported for the fourth day at several points at both the eastern and western ends of the Sino-Indian border.

A Defense Ministry statement issued by Peiping on 22 October implied its troops would no longer "restrain themselves" at the McMahon Line, which the Chinese say has been invalidated "once and for all" by Indian action. In the border region immediately adjacent to Bhutan, Chinese forces have pressed several miles south of the line toward Indian headquarters at Towang.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, may be renewing its efforts to bring about Sino-Indian negotiations or an acceptance of mediation.

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\*Peiping, in an apparent attempt to consolidate its gains and present an appearance of reasonableness, on 23 October proposed a disengagement and mutual withdrawal of 12 miles, insisting that both sides respect the line of "actual control" along the entire frontier. If the Indians would accept this, the Chinese would fall back from the present line of confrontation in the northeast border area and consider the "customary traditional" boundary--but not the McMahon line--the line of "actual control" in this sector. Peiping further proposed that following the negotiation of

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such a cease-fire a meeting of prime ministers take place in either Peiping or New Delhi.

Indian leaders, who have spurned similar withdrawal proposals from the Chinese in the past, only yesterday reiterated publicly their refusal to negotiate under military pressure. They probably will calculate that acceptance of the proposal now would be interpreted as submission to Chinese aggression. However, in rejecting Peiping's terms, New Delhi may make counterproposals in order to promote the idea of a cease-fire and keep the door open to a peaceful solution.

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Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk's draft proposal for an international agreement to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality reportedly will be along the lines of the Laos settlement, requiring the withdrawal of both the French and US military missions. Sihanouk is expected to forward the draft to "interested" countries shortly.

25X1 Sihanouk appears reluctant, however, to lose Western military support for Cambodia's armed forces. [redacted] the US MAAG mission might be allowed to remain if it changed its name.

Sihanouk has publicly challenged leftists in his government to obtain from the bloc equivalent replacements for Western military assistance to Cambodia. [redacted]

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